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Abstract
We analyse the structure and resilience of a massive encounter network generated from com-
muters who share the same bus ride on a single day within a metropolitan city. We demonstrate
our analysis using a case study of the network created by all the commuters who utilised the
public bus system during a typical weekday in the whole of Singapore using smartcard data. We
show that the network structure is of random-exponential type with small world features rather
than a scale-free network. Within one day, 99.97% of all commuters are connected approxi-
mately within 7 steps of each other. We report on how this network structure changes upon
application of a threshold based on the encounter duration (TE). Among others, we demon-
strate that the total number of connected commuters reduces by 50% when we set the threshold
for TE to be 15mins. We then assess the dynamics of infection spreading by comparing the
eﬀect of both random and targeted removal strategies of commuters. By assuming that the
network characteristic is invariant day after day, our simulation indicates that without node
removal, 99% of the commuter network will be infected within 7 days of the onset of infection.
While a targeted removal strategy is demonstrated to delay the onset of the maximum number
of infected individuals, it is not able to eﬀectively isolate commuters away from being eventually
infected.
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1 Introduction
The global population of urban metropolitan cities has grown rapidly for the past decade and is
projected to continue on an upward trajectory throughout the century. The threat of a serious
global epidemic in the modern world has also become closer to reality with the promulgation
of deadly diseases such as avian inﬂuenza, Ebola and SARS. Understanding the mechanism
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of spread of infectious diseases in these highly clustered city landscapes is therefore a major
concern for all city planners around the world.
Previous studies have looked at the epidemic spreading from a structural perspective and
found that the network structure is critical to the mechanism of epidemic spread. Most no-
tably, scale-free networks have shown to have distinct spreading characteristics as compared to
traditional random networks [7], especially the absence of an epidemic threshold [11]. Various
other studies utilize synthetic network generation methods to highlight the diﬀerent spreading
characteristics [5] while studies with actual empirical data are much harder to come by.
Spreading dynamics on online social networks are commonly analysed due to the ease of
mining their network datasets [12]. These studies also have interesting applications such as
curbing the spreading of computer viruses [11] and information transmission within the online
realm. Social networks typically have scale-free properties and signiﬁcantly long-tailed degree
distributions as the total number of connections have no upper band constraints. However,
physical contact networks have diﬀerent structural properties as compared to online systems
due to physical limitations to the amount of contact people might have with each other.
Using empirical data, the eﬀect of the rate of mobility [8] on the spreading of diseases
have been studied both for the case of intra-city [6][17] as well as the longer range inter-city
[3][2] travel. However, few of these methods are granular enough to account for individual-level
interactions. Most notably we note the work of Sun et al [15] who previously investigated
the encounter network created from commuters in the public bus system of Singapore. An
investigation was also conducted on the susceptibility of the network to epidemic spread by using
a simulation based approach using a variant of the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected Model (SEI).
The investigation also recommended a methodology for early detection of a major outbreak
using the highest connected individuals as detectors [14].
In this article, we analyse the structure of the bus encounter network of a typical metropoli-
tan city with the aim of identifying eﬀective strategies to mitigate epidemic spreading. This is
conducted by considering the resilience of the network which has previously been found to be
highly dependent on the network structure [1]. We follow the infection spreading simulation
conducted in [14] but with a recovery state (SIR) in order to make a more realistic assessment
on the potential maximum number of infected persons in the network. We then assess the
impact of various node removal strategies on the dynamics of infection spread anchored on the
empirically measured transmissivity rate of virulent inﬂuenza.
2 Building the Massive Commuter Encounter Network of
a Metropolitan Public Bus System
We take the public transportation network of Singapore as a case study for understanding the
nature and dynamics of encounters that occur between diﬀerent commuters. In Singapore, the
public bus system together with the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) and Light Rail Transit (LRT)
Systems form the primary modes of public transportation. Whilst the MRT is the primary mode
of transportation of choice for journeys involving cross-island travel, public bus services serve
both as an alternative to MRT for making long range travel and intra-neighborhood travel. The
bus system is serviced by approximately 4600 bus stops spread across the island and consists of
about 340 diﬀerent bus services varying in route length and distance [10]. Whilst it is diﬃcult
to study commuter encounters within the MRT and LRT systems due to lack of granular data,
encounters occurring within the public bus system is easily discerned from smartcard data.
In order to build a network model that represents all the encounters between the various
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(a) Commuter network for one
journey
(b) Multiple connected jour-
neys
Figure 1: A visualization of a sample encounter network of commuters for a) a single bus trip
b) several journeys of the same bus linked together. The size of the node is proportional to
the degree while nodes of a similar colour and grouped by the time of the journey. Note that
there are several commuters which link diﬀerent clusters together ensuring full connectivity of
the network. Network visualizations are created using the open source software Gephi [4].
commuters, we utilised an anonymised historical dataset obtained from the Land Transport
Authority of Singapore that records about 3.4 million commuter journeys consisting of about
1.5 million unique commuters who utilised the public bus service for a single day in March 2012
within Singapore. When a commuter boards a bus during its journey by tapping his smartcard
onto the reader, the dataset stores the record of the unique ID of the smartcard, the bus ID,
the time, as well as the starting bus stop location. The same information is also recorded at
the end of the journey when the commuter taps his card to leave the bus. By combining the
information of diﬀerent commuters who were together on the same bus ID during the same
journey, we can discern which passengers encountered each other during the course of their
journey. Each commuter that boarded a bus is thereby represented by a node in the network
model. When he boards the bus, a network edge is added between him and every commuter who
was already present in the bus. When the commuter leaves the bus, the diﬀerent amounts of
time spent on the bus together with the remaining commuters is recorded as an edge attribute
in the network. We refer to this time as the encounter duration TE throughout this paper. In
cases where multiple edges are formed between two individuals on the same day, we simply take
the total encounter duration given by the sum of all encounter times happening within the day.
The networks of all the journeys of the 3617 active buses for the day are then combined
together into a single massive nationwide network. Notably, selected passengers would unwit-
tingly link the diﬀerent networks together whenever they travel on multiple journeys within
the day (refer to Fig. 1(b)). We also note that the mean number of journeys per commuter
obtained from the dataset is 2.27. This number is indeed consistent with the average number
of two journeys per commuter, which typically consists of the morning work/school commute
followed by the commute home in the evening.
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Network Statistics Quantity
Total number of nodes (N) 1,490,565
Number of isolated nodes 294
Total number of edges (E) 75,670,986
Network Density ( 2EN(N−1) ) 6.81× 10−5
Mean degree k¯n 101.55
Mean Encounter Duration (T¯E) 9.64 mins
Clustering Coeﬃcient 0.56
Size of GC (% of N) 1,490,140 (99.97%)
Diameter of GC (approx.) 7
Table 1: Summary of statistics for the commuter encounter network
3 Features of the massive commuter encounter network
Here we provide several deﬁnitions of network statistics that we use as measures to characterise
the encounter network. The size of the network denoted as N is the total number of nodes (n) in
the network which corresponds to the number of commuters who were recorded to have utilized
the bus in the smartcard dataset. The total number of edges denoted as E corresponds to all of
the encounters which occurred between any two commuters and the number of edges adjacent
to any node is known as the degree of the node n and this is denoted as kn. The encounter
duration TE is deﬁned earlier as the total amount of time spent between two commuters during
their encounters for the day.
A connected component of the network is any subset of the network in which all of its nodes
can be reached in a ﬁnite number of steps. The size of the giant connected component (we refer
to this as GC throughout this article) is the maximum size out of all the connected components
obtained from the network. This provides a measure of the potential reach of any infectious
disease within the network. Given an unlimited amount of time, an infected node that is found
within the GC will essentially be able to infect all of the nodes within itself.Another network
measure is the diameter of the network deﬁned as the maximum shortest path between any two
nodes in the network. This measure represents the capability or reach of the network and a
smaller diameter can be associated with faster transmission between nodes.
Table 1 summarizes of the basic characteristics and statistics of the network obtained from
the encounters of the commuters in the dataset. We observe that this massive network appears
to be highly clustered (a random Erdos-Renyi network of comparable size yielded a clustering
coeﬃcient of 6.78×10−5 as compared to the 0.56 obtained here) with a signiﬁcantly high mean
degree of about 100. We note that this number is indeed consistent with the capacity of the
buses used in the Singapore bus system which is 90 for a single-decker and 133 for a double
decker. The network is expected to have high clustering since all possible edges are created
between every commuter that was present together in the bus.
Notably, the degree distribution of the network is found to be exponentially distributed
(refer to Fig. 2a) and not scale-free, this can be explained by understanding that it would
not be physically possible for a number of individuals to have a exponentially large number of
edges due to physical contraints on the vehicle size. This result raises major implications on our
attempts to characterise the resilience of the network since scale-free networks and exponential
networks have been shown to respond very diﬀerently to diﬀerent mechanisms of attack [1].
Discussion on this concern is covered in more detail in Section 5.
The resulting GC for our encounter network is found to consist of 99.97% of the total number
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of nodes in the network. In addition, the approximate diameter of this 1.5 million node network
is only 7 showing that the network exhibits the small-world property [16]. While this result is
expected for random networks with a high degree of connections, the result is still alarming as
it implies that theoretically a single commuter with a highly infectious disease will essentially
be able to infect almost all of the 1.5million commuters in the city within 7 steps.
4 Eﬀect of thresholding encounter duration on the net-
work
The capability of the encounter in transmitting an infectious disease is dependent on the amount
of time spent during the encounter [9]. Figure 2 shows the impact of applying a threshold based
on the encounter duration TE suggesting that:
f(kn) ≈ a exp−bkn where a, b ≈ g(TE) (1)
The exponent b gradually decreases with TE up to a threshold of 25mins until which it
remains stabilizes before decreasing again after TE > 35mins. This ﬂat region is interesting as
it represents a region upon which the network structure is invariant with TE , hence the spreading
dynamics is maintained for this region. The network slowly becomes disconnected due to the
removal of many of the edges with TE below the threshold. The size of the GC reduces rapidly
to half of the original number after a threshold of 15mins is applied. (refer to Fig. 3) The
total number of components thus increases accordingly due to the increasing number of nodes
which become disconnected from the GC. Although the size of the GC decreases, its diameter
increases gradually from 7 to a maximum of 41 at 50mins. The mean component size drops
rapidly at TE = 1 to approximately 1, indicating that most of the nodes essentially become
isolated from each other instead of forming smaller clusters (i.e. many of these nodes have 0
incoming edges).
In summary, we observe that the network rapidly loses its ability to infect the full global
population as we increase the threshold to about 15-20mins since a majority of the commuters
are no longer connected to each other. However, we note that even after a high threshold is
applied, the GC endures and does not abruptly fracture into smaller components. This is unlike
the abrupt phase change behaviour observed that resembles percolation in random networks
[1].
5 Structural attack and random failure of network struc-
ture
We analyse the resilience of the bus encounter network by gradually removing a percentage
of nodes and the edges associated with them. Three diﬀerent strategies are compared to each
other; a) Random removal of a selected percentage of nodes, b) targeted removal of highest
degree nodes ﬁrst, and c) Removal of highest betweenness centrality ﬁrst where betweenness
centrality is deﬁned as:
bc(v) =
∑
s,t∈V,s =t
σ(s → t|v)
σ(s → t) (2)
where σ(s → t) is the sum of shortest paths between the nodes s and t while σ(s → t|v)
is the sum of shortest paths between s and t that pass through the node v. We use this
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Distribution curves for degree and mean encounter duration respectively. (a) The
degree distribution of the encounter network closely resembles an exponential distribution
f(kn) ≈ a expbkn even after successive thresholding is applied from 0 to 50mins. The num-
bered labels represent the amount of threshold (in mins) applied to the network. The inset
plot shows the variation in exponent b of the degree distribution curves after linear ﬁtting. The
arrow highlights the range of TE for which b remains relatively invariant. (b) The encounter
duration distribution also resembles an exponential distribution although when plotted against
degree in the inset, it reveals little correlation between the two quantities.
Figure 3: The plot of diﬀerent network properties as the threshold encounter duration is in-
creased. The values are plotted here as a fraction of their maximum obtained values so that they
may be plotted on the same axis. For reference and completeness, we provide the maximum
values here: the maximum mean component size () obtained at TE = 0mins is 2.26 which
drops rapidly to 1 at TE =1 min. The maximum diameter () and the maximum number of
components () obtained at TE=50mins is 41 and 1,434,580 respectively.
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Figure 4: The plot of diﬀerent network properties varying with the number of nodes removed
in discrete steps of 5% from 5% to 50%. Unﬁlled circles (◦) represent randomly removed nodes,
ﬁlled circles(•) targeted removal of highest degree nodes while square markers () represent
removal of nodes with highest betweenness. Dashed lines represent connecting guides for the
eye.
third strategy as an alternative method of attack because evidence from the subset network
visualizations suggested that several low degree nodes formed bridges between diﬀerent journey
networks (see Fig. 1(b)). We conjectured that these nodes could in fact be identiﬁed by their
higher betweenness centrality scores.
Since the network shows similar degree structure to a random network, we conjecture that
targeted removal of highest degree nodes might not be as eﬀective in breaking the network
structure as compared to the removal of nodes in a scale-free network. The results support the
idea as the method of removal did not aﬀect the rate of change in size of GC or the number of
components (see Fig. 4) despite the fact that an overall greater number of edges are removed for
the cases of targeted removal as compared to random removal. However, the results did indicate
that targeted removal signiﬁcantly increases the diameter of the GC as compared to random
removal. The diﬀerence between the removal of high betweenness nodes as compared to high
degree is not signiﬁcant. Since the calculation of betweenness centrality is computationally more
expensive as compared to node degree, it is therefore not a good choice for targeted removal of
nodes in this network.
6 Simulating Epidemic Spread in the Encounter Network
Finally, we test the capability of the network when subjected to several infected commuters
using the standard SIR epidemic spread model. As our network is based on the encounters in a
single day, we represent each day as one time step in our simulation. All the commuters begin
in the susceptible (S) state and a small number of index commuters are placed into the infected
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state (I). Commuters adjacent to these index cases in the network have a probability β of being
infected by them and will transition into the infected state (I) themselves during the next time
step. After being in the infected state, the commuter will have a probability γ of transitioning
into the ﬁnal recovered (R) state where the commuter is now immune to the disease in question
(see Fig 5(a)).
We make several assumptions in our model; the network is assumed to remains static
throughout the period of the simulation, disregarding the eﬀect of the weekends which would
have created diﬀerent network structures due to the changes in the amount and pattern of travel
for the commuters. We also assume that infection happens solely through the bus encounter
network, ignoring the eﬀect of other mechanisms of contact such as those occurring either at
home or at the workplace. We also assume that after getting infected, the commuter travel
patterns do not change which, in reality does change due to commuters being more likely to
stay at home or going to the see the doctor whilst refraining from going to work or school. We
also set the simulation such that newly infected passengers may only infect other passengers
on the day after being infected. This mechanism therefore provides an automatic incubation
period of approximately one day between the time that commuter gets infected to the point
where he himself is infectious to other commuters.
Our selection for the appropriate infection and recovery rates β and γ is based on the
infection and recovery rates reported in the simulation conducted for a high resolution contact
network located around a school[13]. This in turn was based on the infection rate of inﬂuenza
spreading through a commercial airliner [9] which is equivalent to an infection rate of 0.003
for every 20 seconds. For the purpose of our simulation which has a time step of 1 day, we
simplify by using the mean encounter duration of 9.64mins to calculate a ﬂat infection rate
per day for all commuter interactions. This provides us with the ﬁnal selected infection rate of
β1day = 1−(1−β20sec) 9.64×60sec20sec = 0.083. The time taken for commuters in our model to recover
from the disease is normally distributed with mean 1/γ = 10 days with a variance of 5 days
while the initial number of infected individuals consisted of 10 randomly chosen commuters.
The results show that within 7 days of the simulation, the number of infected commuters
rises rapidly and exponentially up to a maximum of 93.03% out of all the commuters. (see
Fig. 5(b)) The network commuters recover from the epidemic (n(I) = 0) only after about
30 days. We compare this result to against two diﬀerent simulations in which the network is
subjected to edge removal using both targeted and random removal strategies. It is shown that
amongst the nodes that remained in the network, a maximum of about 90% of the remaining
nodes are still infected with little diﬀerence between the two strategies. However, for the case
of targeted removal, we observed that the time of maximum infection is delayed by about
5 days. This evidence therefore supports our earlier statement where we showed that while
the connectedness of the network is similar for diﬀerent removal strategies, the diﬀerences in
diameter of the resulting GC aﬀected the speed in which the disease is transmitted through the
network.
7 Conclusion and discussion
In summary, we have constructed the network generated from encounters between commuters
sharing the same public bus for a typical weekday for the entire population of commuters in
a typical metropolitan city. The network has been shown to have an immense capability of
transmitting diseases due to its unique structure which is highly clustered, extremely dense
and resistant to targeted node removal. The network is also well connected with 99.97% of the
commuters within 7 steps of each other, and our simulations reveal that the network has the
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Figure 5: a) A schematic diagram of the standard SIR model with three states: susceptible
(S), infected (I) and recovered (R). b) The dynamics of growth of infected commuters in the
encounter network with an infection rate β = 0.083 and the recovery rate of γ = 0.1 per day.
Three scenarios are tested: The full network (◦), a network where 35% of randomly selected
nodes are isolated (•) and network where 35% of highest degree nodes are isolated (). The
horizontal blue line shows the maximum % of nodes (65%) still connected to the network
relevant to the two removal cases.
ability to infect the entire population of commuters within 7 days of the onset of infection. While
these initial results may be alarming, we show that when a threshold on the encounter duration
is applied, the network fragments easily. This means that only highly infectious diseases which
do not require much time (<10mins) for transmission are actually capable of infecting the entire
network. Although targeted removal of essential nodes is found to be unable to isolate the bulk
of nodes found within the remaining giant component, it is also shown to be able to delay the
onset of the epidemic thus other diﬀerent combinations of mitigation strategies could be more
easily employed.
Our study indicates that the mechanism of spread of diseases during the encounters of
commuters with other strangers whilst using the public transportation system is critical and
should not be ignored in a comprehensive model. While contact network tracing could be easily
conducted for individuals sharing the same workplace or home, it is much harder for one to
trace the spread of disease for highly dynamic networks such as the one highlighted in this
article. The availability of travel data, such as that used in this study should therefore be an
essential portion of future contact network tracing for a highly infectious outbreak. This work
also largely ignores the signiﬁcant role of bus drivers who will certainly pose as massive hubs
for infection spreading within this commuter network. If data which bus drivers were on duty
could be made available, the impact of bus drivers as compared to commuter could be modelled
and quantiﬁed, and diﬀerent strategies for targeted removal could therefore be devised. Our
work also paves the way for more detailed analyses hopefully resulting from the combination of
travel datasets such as that identiﬁed in this work together with datasets identifying the home
and workplaces/schools of the commuters.
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